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1. Introduction 
In his reply to our paper “Language in language evolution research” (Wacewicz et 
al. 2020), José-Luis Mendívil-Giró (2020) argues against one of the central points 
of our paper, namely that the definitions of the term Faculty of Language in the 
Narrow Sense (FLN) in Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch (2002; HCF) and Fitch, Hauser, 
& Chomsky (2005; FHC) are incompatible. In addition, he argues that the termino-
logy proposed by HCF could be fruitfully applied to the theoretical avenues 
surveyed in the remainder of our paper, and that the idea of the language-ready 
brain, which is discussed at length in our paper, shares many theoretical assump-
tions with HCF’s approach to language.  
Although we do not agree with the main points of Mendívil-Giró’s critique, 
we want to start by emphasising that there are many good and valuable specific 
observations in his reply. Firstly, the “faculty of language” is, obviously, not the 
same as “language.” We agree with Mendívil-Giró that “HCF is not about lang-
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uage in general, but about the human faculty of language (FLB), a property or 
state of the human brain that allows us to learn and use languages.” The original 
authors were careful to explicitly note this difference (HCF 2002: 1570), as were 
we, by repeatedly using the formulation “(the faculty of) language.” This should 
not however be used to question the centrality of the term “faculty of language” 
for language evolution and the fact that very frequently researchers (especially 
from the biolinguistic tradition) take it as a shorthand for “language” in this 
context. Consider, for example, the following quote from Fitch (2010: 22): 
“[R]esearchers (including ourselves) had been using the same word, ‘language’, 
to talk about two different things (FLB and FLN) for many years.” Mendívil-Giró 
agrees on both of those points: “In fact, the object of study from the biolinguistic 
point of view adopted by Chomsky, Fitch an Hauser cannot be other than FLB 
(that is, FL).” Secondly, we seem to be in full agreement with Mendívil-Giró when 
he declares that: 
 
It would certainly be naive to think that we can have a “correct” 
definition of language. The same is true in any field of science: you do 
not need a universally accepted definition of life to study the origin of 
life, nor a universally accepted definition of natural species to study 
the origin of species (not to mention matter or energy). Yet shared 
assumptions about these objects are clearly needed if the sciences that 
study them are to be viable.           (2020: 146) 
 
In our target paper, we do emphasise this former point (no single “correct” 
definition of language). But we also agree with the latter point (shared assump-
tions are needed), while noting that the shared assumptions will form a family-
resemblance pattern without however reaching a full overlap. In sum, here 
Mendívil-Giró’s position seems to be fully compatible with ours, as we extens-
ively elaborate it in the Discussion section of our paper. For example: 
 
We distinguish between definitions on two different and clearly 
separable levels. One is the level of more specific technical terms that 
function as building blocks of theories and especially of hypotheses, 
which require unambiguous formulations so as to meet the 
fundamental standards of non-triviality and falsifiability. This level is 
thus essential for science to make progress by conclusively resolving 
arguments with recourse to empirical data rather than getting stuck on 
conceptual differences. The other level, however, is the global level of 
macroscopic notions, which cannot (without further specification) 
function as building blocks of specific theories or hypotheses but have 
a different role, related instead to integrative and classificatory goals. 
(Wacewicz et al., 2020: 87–88) 
 
In our paper, we have already pointed out that any theory-specific use of the term 
“language” will inevitably remain meronymous, in the sense of always relating 
only to parts of the complex phenomenon. We have therefore proposed to push 
definitions one level down: Our proposal was to leave language as an 
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unanalysable prime and instead provide rigorous definitions of particular 
components or aspects of language. 
 
2. On the Definitions of FLN 
One of our main points of contention with Mendívil-Giró’s response is located in 
Section 2, as many of his claims are falsified by the quotes from HCF and FHC 
already provided in our target paper. He claims that our summary of the define-
tion of FLN in HCF is incorrect. In particular, while we show that in HCF “unique-
ness to humans” is a hypothesis about FLN, Mendívil-Giró argues that it is part of 
the definition of FLN. Although the reading proposed by Mendívil-Giró is a good 
interpretation of the terminological distinction between FLN and FLB in the light 
of the 2005 paper by FHC, the actual published text of the 2002 paper (HCF) 
clearly contains the inconsistencies that we have pointed out and documented 
with quotations.1 
In science, it is crucial to keep definitions and hypotheses apart. A major 
source of the inconsistencies that we have pointed out—and, by extension, the 
confusion that leads to the discussion we are engaging in here—lies in a conflation 
of hypotheses and definitions. In the remainder of this section, we will therefore 
aim at teasing these two aspects apart. Mendívil-Giró’s stance that the FLN defini-
tion in HCF is extensional while the FHC one is intensional is, in our view, not 
convincing, although it can prove very useful in understanding how exactly the 
different conceptualisations of FLN conflate definitions and hypotheses. As we 
have already pointed out in our original paper, both HCF and FHC repeatedly 
make it clear that their definition is, first and foremost, intensional (to use 
Mendívil-Giró’s term) and that its extension, i.e. what belongs to FLN, has to be 
empirically determined. Thus, any extensional claims that go beyond the 
provided definition are hypotheses, not definitions. The feature of being uniquely 
human is not part of the definition of FLN in HCF—instead, the assumption that 
FLN is uniquely human is explicitly framed as a hypothesis that could be wrong. 
In FHC, on the other hand, it becomes a major defining criterion for FLN, culmin-
ating in the possibility that FLN could be an empty set if no features that are 
uniquely human can be found. 
To illustrate our point in more detail, let us tease apart the definitions and 
hypotheses that can be found in the original papers. 
 
Definition. 
Mendívil-Giró maintains that 
 
[HCF] propose that the FLN label should be reserved, by convention, 
for those components of the FL that (supposedly) are neither shared 
with other species (are specifically human) nor are part of other human 
cognitive domains (are language-specific); hence the use of the word 
narrow.                   (2020:147) 
 
1 A more extensive treatment of the inconsistencies was offered in Wacewicz (2012), which was the 
basis for our discussion in section 3 of our target paper. 
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However, he does not point us to a quote with the exact phrasing of this proposal. 
The likely reason for this is that there is no such quote in the entire published text 
of HCF (of course, we challenge the critical reader to find the relevant fragment 
of the HCF paper). Instead, HCF explicitly argue that FLN may be unique to 
humans, adding that “this represents a tentative, testable hypothesis in need of 
further empirical investigation” (HCF: 1576 [emphasis added]). In FHC, by con-
trast, species-specificity is part of the definition of FLN: 
 
The contents of FLN are to be empirically determined, and could 
possibly be empty, if empirical findings showed that none of the 
mechanisms involved are uniquely human or unique to language, and 
that only the way they are integrated is specific to human language. 
The distinction itself is intended as a terminological aid to 
interdisciplinary discussion and rapprochement, and obviously does not 
constitute a testable hypothesis.     (2005: 180–181 [emphasis added]) 
 
At the beginning of Section 3 of our original paper, we list three quotes from HCF, 
where HCF define FLN as an abstract linguistic computational system, in parti-
cular when they first introduce that notion (p. 1571): “Faculty of language–narrow 
sense (FLN). FLN is the abstract linguistic computational system alone, indepen-
dent of the other systems with which it interacts and interfaces” (HCF: 1571, italics 
in the original). Further, one of the HCF authors writes: “FLN … was defined by 
Hauser et al. (2002) as a computational process that is responsible for the gener-
ative and hierarchical properties of narrow syntax” (Tincoff & Hauser 2006; again, 
a quote already cited in our paper). 
The fact that all these quotes were ignored by Mendívil-Giró indicates that 
his proposed interpretation seems to be only very loosely based on the actual 
content of HCF. 
 
Hypothesis. 
We show that HCF hypothesise that FLN is uniquely human (and uniquely lingu-
istic), and provide the specific relevant wordings in three quotes in Section 3.1.2 
of our original paper. Although Mendívil-Giró describes this as our “interpre-
tation,” this is the literal published text of HCF, for example “Hypothesis 3: Only 
FLN is uniquely human” (HCF: 1573, italics in the original). Note that species-
specificity is explicitly framed as a hypothesis here, and nothing in the text indi-
cates that it should be understood as a definition or a terminological proposal.2 
Quite to the contrary, HCF specifically assert that human uniqueness is not predi-
cated definitionally of FLN, but as a hypothesis about it: “[A]lthough we have 
argued that most if not all of FLB is shared with other species, whereas FLN may be 
 
2 Mendívil-Giró does use one quote to illustrate his position here: “Their hypothesis in HCF is that 
the FLN label should be reserved only for the computational component: ‘We propose in this 
hypothesis that FLN comprises only the core computational mechanisms of recursion as they appear 
in narrow syntax and the mapping to the interfaces’” (HCF 2002: 1573). This is a misinterpretation. 
As we show above, HCF first define FLN as “the abstract linguistic computational system” and then 
hypothesise in this quote that this abstract system “comprises only the core computational mechan-
isms of recursion”. 
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unique to humans, this represents a tentative, testable hypothesis in need of further 
empirical investigation” (HCF: 1578, italics ours). 
All in all, the definitions provided in HCF and FHC are only compatible if 
we conflate hypotheses and definitions (again, a point clearly demonstrated and 
documented with specific quotes in our target paper). This does not exclude the 
possibility that FLN is widely understood in the way proposed by Mendívil-Giró. 
But note that this fact, in turn, lends even more support to the point we made in 
Section 3, where we argued that “the specific wording of the top-down definitions 
of language was inconsequential to the research practice of the field.” 
 
3. The Language-Ready Brain 
In Section 3 of his reply, Mendívil-Giró addresses the remaining theoretical frame-
works discussed in our original paper: 
 
(i) Language as a Multimodal Phenomenon (Kendon; McNeill; Zlatev) 
(ii) Language as a Complex Adaptive System (Steels; Kirby) 
(iii) Language as a Form of Social Interaction (Tomasello; Levinson) 
(iv) Language in the Language-Ready Brain (Arbib; Bouchard; Boeckx & 
Benítez-Burraco) 
 
Mendívil-Giró argues that the terminological distinction between FLN and FLB is 
compatible with each of these approaches, focusing on the fourth type of models. 
The first three lines of research are discussed surprisingly briefly in his reply. He 
devotes only one line to the view of language as a multimodal phenomenon 
(Section 4.1 of our paper) and writes that it identifies “language with speech and 
gesture, and would therefore be a central part of the study of the evolution of the 
sensorimotor component (SM) of FL.” Thus, his analysis arguably oversimplifies 
both the multimodal conception of language and the FLN/FLB approach. The 
main tenet of the latter is that there is a set of formal properties of language that 
can be abstracted away from instances of linguistic usage. The views discussed by 
us in Section 4.1 of our paper vehemently oppose such a conceptualisation. As 
Kendon argues, language is only feasible in the context of other semiotic systems, 
most importantly gesture, together with which it is used—abstracted away from 
this rich semiotic context, language itself fades away (Kendon 2004, 2014). 
Further, it is difficult to agree with Mendívil-Giró that the multimodal approaches 
describe the evolution of the sensorimotor component of FL. This statement 
disregards the essentially cognitive nature of these proposals, for example, of 
McNeill’s Growth Point (McNeill 1992, 2005), foundational to his conception of 
language and its evolution (McNeill 2012), or of mimesis, on which Zlatev (2008) 
builds the semiotic hierarchy to account for the emergence of language (Zlatev et 
al. 2020). On a more general level, Mendívil-Giró misses the point that for Kendon, 
McNeill, and Zlatev multimodality (or polysemioticity) does not represent an 
accidental property of language but its design property (cf. Vigliocco et al. 2014). 
The language-as-a-Complex-Adaptive-System (CAS) view is dealt with 
equally briefly. Mendívil-Giró states that this view “is not particularly interested 
in FL as a biological object, nor, therefore, in the evolution of its components.” 
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However, if this is meant to imply that proponents of a CAS view are not particu-
larly interested in the biological and cognitive dimension of our ability to acquire 
and process language, this statement is misleading. In fact, the proposal that 
“language is shaped by the brain” (Christiansen & Chater 2008) highlights that 
the properties that shape language structure in order to make it learnable by 
humans are of fundamental importance to understanding language and its evo-
lution. This importantly includes the complex interplay of biological properties as 
well as cultural and interactional processes (Beckner et al. 2009; Christiansen & 
Chater 2016). Importantly, these biological and neurological properties are seen 
as being domain-general in nature (Beckner et al. 2009; Pleyer & Hartmann 2019).  
It is also somewhat misleading to state that the following view is increas-
ingly popular (Mendívil-Giró): “[L]anguages somehow externally developed this 
complexity and motivated the adaptations that would lead to the language-ready 
brain.” In fact, it is not the position of the complex adaptive system approach that 
languages “somehow” developed complexity. In fact, it is one of the main 
research avenues of this approach to investigate the factors that influence the 
emergence of structure and complexity in languages, with researchers having 
found a wealth of social, ecological, and other factors that influence the shape of 
languages in interaction with biological biases (e.g., Bentz 2018; Lupyan & Dale 
2010, 2016; Raviv et al. 2020). 
Mendívil-Giró is similarly laconic in his evaluation of the social-interactive 
perspective (Section 4.3 of our target paper). In this respect, he notes: “[Tomasello 
and Levinson] simply ignore the computational dimension of language (FLN).” 
In fact, the idea that there is some computational core of language is incompatible 
with their views. As we stress in in Section 4.3 of our paper, language for them is 
a form of social cognition and action, i.e. it is the implementation of socio-
cognitive mechanisms, such as shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter 
2007) or the “interaction engine” (Levinson 2006), in the process of communi-
cation (Tomasello 2008; Levinson & Holler 2014). Beyond this characterisation, 
there is no language, which Mendívil-Giró apparently finds difficult to accept and 
proposes that their work “constitute[s] a part of the investigation of the evolution 
of the relation between the CI and SM components of FLB.” 
Tomasello and Levinson are committed to a deeply functionalist view, 
whereby language serves to achieve social goals—direct attention (Tomasello 
2008), aid collaboration (Levinson 2006), or reasoning about each other’s 
intentions (Tomasello 2008). There are of course properties, for example, codify-
cation (Tomasello), which distinguish language from other semiotic systems (e.g., 
gesture), which serve similar goals. However, the design of language to a large 
extent depends on the same general-purpose mechanisms as these other systems 
do (and accordingly, it entails a different sort of computations at the brain level), 
while its unique characteristics are the result of the interplay of these mechanisms 
with cultural-historical processes (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007; Tomasello 2008; 
Evans & Levinson 2009). In addition, it should be noted that Tomasello has 
written extensively on his usage-based, construction grammar approach to 
language acquisition (e.g., Tomasello 2003, 2011). This approach investigates how 
children use their abilities of intention-reading and pattern-recognition to build 
up networks of constructions of different degrees of abstractness and schematicity 
(e.g., Tomasello 2003; Diessel 2013). This also means that the cognitive dimension 
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of language acquisition and processing, which is extensively researched in 
constructionist approaches (e.g., Hoffmann & Trousdale 2013), is highly relevant 
for the social-interactive perspective. It is therefore misleading to say that the 
computational dimension of language is simply ignored in these approaches. 
Instead, it is reframed and viewed from a different perspective. 
In his more extensive discussion of the language-ready brain hypothesis, 
Mendívil-Giró raises an interesting question when he points out that this term can 
be understood in two ways: “Either the brain first developed, through evolution 
[…], or languages developed as complex cultural objects and then they served as 
an adaptive environment for the evolution of the language-ready brain from a 
‘language-unready’ brain.” This is a very relevant point as there are indeed 
multiple interpretations of the concept of language-readiness. From a gradualist 
point of view that is taken by most of the current approaches that we have 
reviewed in our paper, it would make sense to assume a co-evolutionary scenario. 
Accordingly, some brain innovations increasing language complexity might 
certainly result from biological changes (e.g., mutations in specific genes control-
ling brain development or neuron interconnection patterns).  
Nonetheless, increasing evidence supports the view that specific language 
features can have a differential impact on selected cognitive abilities, such as wor-
king memory (Amici et al. 2019). This means that increasing language complexity 
resulting from cultural processes can eventually remodel our cognitive architect-
ture, particularly if “cognitive gadgets” aimed to process language features more 
quickly and efficiently are implemented (Heyes 2018). Eventually, these changes 
can be fixed (and transmitted) via, for example, epigenetic marking. On this view, 
the statement that the language-ready brain precedes language is as problematic 
as the statement that language precedes the language-ready brain, and the answer 
to this particular chicken-and-egg question crucially depends on what we mean 
by “language.”  
However, this is also an area where a monolithic definition of language 
would not prove very useful—at best, it would allow for positing an arbitrary cut-
off point in the sense that we speak of “language” as soon as a specific feature or 
set of features is available, but it would not help us understand the processes in-
volved. Furthermore, this also implies that, as noted, even “language-readiness” 
can be seen as a gradual concept. A co-evolutionary scenario in fact allows for the 
possibility that there were further subtle biological changes since the first 
emergence of forms of language (Schoenemann 2009; Hurford 2012; Benítez-
Burraco 2017), particularly, because our brain has been changing since our incep-
tion, reaching its present-day variation between about 100 and 35 kya (Neubauer 
et al. 2018). 
 
4. Conclusion 
While we do not agree with some of Mendívil-Giró’s main points, we do agree 
with his general assessment that “the field of language evolution research is in 
good health,” given fruitful debates about key concepts that are constitutive of 
our object of study—language. Just as Mendívil-Giró, we do not share Lewontin’s 
(1998: 109) extremely negative attitude towards language evolution research, but 
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equally, we might agree with him that affirmations of “remarkable progress” are 
difficult to demonstrate—simply because a notion such as “remarkable progress” 
cannot be objectively measured and is very subjective. However, we also hold that 
the claim that we “know essentially nothing about the evolution of our cognitive 
capabilities” (Lewontin 1998: 111) is just as subjective and impossible to quantify 
and measure. Here we find that landmark publications such as Hurford (2007, 
2012), Fitch (2010), Tallerman & Gibson (2012), or the launch of the CHIELD 
database (Roberts et al. 2020) are testament to the wealth of evidence, results, and 
knowledge that has been accumulated in language evolution research, which can 
hardly be said to amount to “essentially nothing.”  
As a case in point, this evidence can serve as useful constraints on hypo-
theses about the evolution of language (Johansson 2005). In addition, recent years 
have also seen a trend towards generating testable, falsifiable hypotheses about 
language evolution, as exemplified, for example, in Progovac’s (2015) research 
programme (see also Progovac 2019). These developments can be seen as convinc-
ing indicators of scientific progress and we agree with Tamariz (2021: 513) that 
answers to “questions about language origins and evolution will come from the 
integration of knowledge from a variety of disciplines.” 
We started our original paper with several quotes—by Wescott (1991), 
Botha (2000), and others—to the effect that language evolution research must 
agree on a single definition of language as a sine qua non for progress. Such claims 
are very intuitive and prima facie very reasonable, but the essence of our original 
paper was to show that they are mistaken. This task was achieved by the lengthy 
section 4 of that paper, in which we demonstrated that several highly influential 
approaches to language evolution research—all of them undeniably central 
examples of latest research in this field—would not be able to agree on a single 
definition of language. In short, we again underscore that it is good to have 
explicit, clear and consistently applied definitions of your central terms—
including language—within a paradigm or approach. This is as true in the field of 
language evolution as anywhere in science. However, at least at present, it does 
not appear to be possible to have a single top-down definition of language across 
all approaches and paradigms of language evolution. In particular, we would 
argue that our understanding of language should be based on the available 
scientific evidence, rather than accommodating the facts to one particular a-priori 
view of what language is and how it may have evolved. 
This is why, if we ask the question of “what evolved”—which can be seen 
as the main question of language evolution research in its totality—the answer 
must simply be: language. This is despite the fact that such an answer would, in 
our view, be both undercomplex and overcomplex. It would be undercomplex 
because it would underestimate the complex set of cognitive prerequisites on 
which language builds, and it would be overcomplex for the same reason—unless 
we limit the scope of the term to specific aspects of language (such as FLN). 
As for the definition(s) of FLN and FLB, we have defended our argument 
that the 2002 and 2005 definitions of FLN are incompatible. We have demons-
trated that the 2005 definition includes elements that were stated as hypotheses 
before, and that the definitions are therefore only congruent if we conflate 
hypotheses and definitions. As our conceptualizations of language—both in 
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everyday discourse and in science—tend to include certain assumptions, it can be 
hard to keep hypotheses and definitions apart, but doing so is vital for enabling a 
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